

# On Problem Kernels for Possible Winner Determination Under the $k$ -Approval Protocol

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# Motivation

Voting scenarios arise in many situations:

- political elections
- committees: decisions about job applicants
- web site rankings
- recommender systems
- choice of restaurant
- ...

# Motivation

Typical voting scenario for joint decision making:

Voters give preferences over a set of candidates as linear orders.

Example: candidates:  $C = \{a, b, c, d\}$

profile:    vote 1:     $a > b > c > d$   
              vote 2:     $a > d > c > b$   
              vote 3:     $b > d > c > a$

Aggregate preferences according to a voting rule

# Partial information

Realistic settings: voters may only provide partial information.

For example:

- not all voters have given their preferences yet
- new candidates are introduced
- a voter cannot compare several candidates because of lack of information

## How to deal with partial information?


We consider whether a distinguished candidate can still win.

# Partial vote

A **partial vote** is a transitive and antisymmetric relation.

Example:  $C = \{a, b, c, d\}$

partial vote:  $a \succ b \succ c, a \succ d$



possible **extensions**:

- 1  $a > d > b > c$
- 2  $a > b > d > c$
- 3  $a > b > c > d$

An extension of a profile of partial votes extends every partial vote.

# Computational Problem

## POSSIBLE WINNER

**Input:** A voting rule  $r$ , a set of candidates  $C$ , a profile of partial votes, and a distinguished candidate  $c$ .

**Question:** Is there an extension profile where  $c$  wins according to  $r$ ?

Considered voting rule:

### $k$ -approval

In every vote, the best  $k$  candidates get one point each. A candidate with most points in total wins.

# Known results for POSSIBLE WINNER

Results for several voting systems, [KONCZAK AND LANG, 2005], [PINI ET AL., IJCAI 2007], [WALSH, AAAI 2007], [XIA AND CONITZER, AAAI 2008], ...

## Results for $k$ -approval

(unweighted voters + unbounded number  $m$  of candidates)

- $k$ -approval is NP-hard for two (or more) partial votes  
[BETZLER, HEMMANN, AND NIEDERMEIER, IJCAI 2009]
- $k$ -approval is NP-hard for any fixed  $k \in \{2, \dots, m - 2\}$   
[BETZLER AND DORN, JCSS 2010]

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## Question of this work


Becomes the problem tractable when the number  $k$  of “one-positions” and the number of votes is small?



# Combined parameters

2 scenarios:

- “number of partial votes” and “number of one-positions”  $k$
- “number of partial votes” and “number of zero-positions”  $k_0$



Motivation: Small committee selects few winners/losers out of a large set of candidates

# Parameterized Complexity

Given an NP-hard problem with input size  $n$  and a parameter  $p$   
**Basic idea:** Confine the combinatorial explosion to  $p$



## Definition


A problem of size  $n$  is called *fixed-parameter tractable* with respect to a parameter  $p$  if it can be solved exactly in  $f(p) \cdot n^{O(1)}$  time.

Parameters: pairs of integers

# Problem kernel

Let  $L \subseteq \Sigma^* \times \Sigma^*$  be a parameterized problem. An instance of  $L$  is denoted by  $(I, p)$ .


## Kernelization



- $(I, p) \in L \iff (I', p') \in L$
- $|p'| \leq |p|$
- $|I'| \leq g(|p'|)$

If  $g$  is a polynomial, we say  $L$  admits a *polynomial problem kernel*.

## Main results



Parameter

 $(t, k)$  $(t, k_0)$ 

FPT (superexponential kernel)

FPT

**no polynomial kernel****polynomial kernel**(unless  $\text{coNP} \subseteq \text{NP/poly}$ )

# Polynomial kernel for $(t, k_0)$

1. Fix the distinguished candidate  $c$  as good as possible
2.  $z(c') := \#$  zero-positions such that  $c'$  is beaten by  $c$
3. **If**  $\sum_{c' \in C} z(c') > t \cdot k_0$ , **then** return “no”  
**else** replace “irrelevant” candidates by a bounded number.

Example:  $C := \{a, b, c, d_1, \dots, d_s\}$ ,  $k_0 = 2$

candidate    points in linear votes

$d_i$              $\leq 10$

$b$               11

$a$               12

$c$               12

partial votes:

$v_1 : a \succ c, b \succ d_1, d_2 \succ d_3 \succ \dots \succ d_s$

$v_2 : d_1 \succ d_2 \succ \dots \succ d_s \succ b \succ c$

$v_3 : d_s \succ c, a \succ d_2$

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$$v_1 : a \succ c, b \succ d_1, d_2 \succ d_3, c \succ C \setminus \{c, a\} \quad \Rightarrow a > c > \dots$$

$$v_2 : d_1 \succ d_2 \succ \dots \succ d_s \succ b \succ c$$

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candidate	points in linear votes	# zero-positions
$d_i$	$\leq 10$	0
$b$	11	1
$a$	12	2
$c$	12	—

partial votes:

- $$v_1 : a \succ c, b \succ d_1, d_2 \succ d_3, c \succ C \setminus \{c, a\}$$
- $$v_2 : d_1 \succ d_2 \succ \dots \succ d_s \succ b \succ c$$
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partial votes:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v_1 : a \succ c, b \succ d_1, d_2 \succ d_3, c \succ C \setminus \{c, a\} & \Rightarrow a \succ c \succ b \succ d \\
 v_2 : d_1 \succ d_2 \succ \dots \succ d_s \succ b \succ c & \Rightarrow d \succ b \succ c \\
 v_3 : d_s \succ c, a \succ d_2, c \succ C \setminus \{c, d_s\} & \Rightarrow c \succ a \succ d
 \end{aligned}$$



# Polynomial kernels

## Theorem

For  $k$ -approval, POSSIBLE WINNER with  $t$  partial votes admits a polynomial kernel with respect to  $(t, k_0)$  with  $k_0$  zero-positions.

Crucial idea: Number of candidates that **have to** take **zero-positions** is bounded in a yes-instance.

Why does this not work for  $(t, k)$ ?

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Why does this not work for  $(t, k)$ ?

In a yes-instance, there might be an unbounded number of candidates that **may** take a **one-position**.

## Theorem

For  $k$ -approval, POSSIBLE WINNER with  $t$  partial votes does not admit a polynomial kernel with respect to  $(t, k)$  unless  $\text{coNP} \subseteq \text{NP/poly}$ .

# Kernelization for $(t, k)$

## Talk

Basic idea for POSSIBLE WINNER for 2-approval leading to a kernel with  $O(t^3)$  candidates for an instance with  $t$  partial votes

## Paper:

- 1 “extension” to  $k$ -approval  
⇒ superexponential kernel showing FPT wrt.  $(k, t)$
- 2 “improve” the kernel size for 2-approval from having  $O(t^3)$  candidates to  $O(t^2)$  candidates based on matching techniques on bipartite graphs

# Kernelization for 2-approval

Parameter  $t$ : number of partial votes

Phase 1:

- 1 Fix  $c$  as good as possible
- 2 Fix all candidates that not beaten by  $c$  when assuming at least one one-position at zero-positions in all votes.  
⇒ remaining candidates can make at least one point

Phase 2:

For every partial vote  $v_i$ , compute the set  $\text{First}(v)$  of candidates that can take the first position.

**Example:**  $v_i : a \succ b, c \succ b, d \succ e \succ f \Rightarrow \text{First}(v_i) = \{a, c, d\}$

## Reduction Rule

If  $|\text{First}(v)| \geq 2t$ , then arbitrarily choose  $2t$  candidates from  $\text{First}(v)$  and fix all remaining candidates in  $v$  at zero-positions.

# Kernelization for 2-approval

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**Correctness:** Consider an extension profile of unreduced instance such that  $c$  wins

Extend all votes except  $v$  in the same way in the reduced instance.

At most  $2 \cdot (t - 1)$  candidates assume a one-position in these votes.

Since  $|\text{First}(v)| \geq 2t$ , there must be two candidates that still can make one point in  $v$  without beating  $c$ .

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**Remaining case:**  $|\text{First}(v)| < 2t$  for a vote  $v$

# Overview of results

POSSIBLE WINNER for  $k$ -approval with  $t$  partial votes

$k_0$  denotes the number of zero-positions

$(t, k_0)$	$(t, k)$
polynomial kernel (FPT)	superexponential kernel (FPT) no polynomial kernel 2-approval : polynomial kernel with $O(t^2)$ candidates
constant $k_0$ : dyn. prog. $2^{O(t)}$	?
constant $t$ : search tree $2^{O(k_0)}$	?

# Thank you